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STRICT LIABILITY AND THE ADMISSIBILITY
OF EVIDENCE OF SUBSEQUENT REMEDIAL
MEASURES UNDER EVIDENCE RULE 407
I. INTRODUCTION
Courts traditionally have refused plaintiffs permission to intro-
duce evidence of subsequent remedial measures as proof of a defend-
ant's negligence or culpable conduct. The Federal Rules of Evidence
codified the common law position.1 Rule 407 recognizes that, while
subsequent remedial measures do not in fact constitute an admission
of prior negligence or culpable conduct, a jury is likely to infer such an
admission. Accordingly, the rule generally excludes evidence of subse-
quent remedial measures. 2 The exclusionary policy is also guided by a
desire not to inhibit manufacturers from undertaking subsequent re-
pairs out of fear that such measures in the future could be deemed an
admission of earlier fault.3
Although Rule 407 does not expressly address strict liability ac-
tions, a majority of the circuits that have considered the issue have
held that Rule 407 does apply in strict products liability actions.4 The
Ninth Circuit has taken this view.5 However, Alaska has codified the
minority position;6 the Alaska rule expressly permits a plaintiff to
Copyright © 1988 by Alaska Law Review
1. FED. R. EVID. 407.
2. FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee's note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 225 (1973).
3. Id.
4. See Gauthier v. AMF, Inc., 788 F.2d 634, 637 (9th Cir. 1986); Flaminio v.
Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 733 F.2d 463, 469 (7th Cir. 1984); Grenada Steel Indus., Inc.
v. Alabama Oxygen Co., Inc., 695 F.2d 883, 888 (5th Cir. 1983); Josephs v. Harris
Corp., 677 F.2d 985, 990 (3d Cir. 1982); Cann v. Ford Motor Co., 658 F.2d 54, 59 (2d
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 960 (1982); Werner v. Upjohn Co., Inc., 628 F.2d
848, 854 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981); Bauman v. Volkswagen-
werk Aktiengesellschaft, 621 F.2d 230, 232 (6th Cir. 1980); Roy v. Star Chopper Co.,
Inc., 584 F.2d 1124, 1134 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 916 (1979).
5. Gauthier v. AMvF, Inc., 788 F.2d 634, 637 (9th Cir. 1986).
6. See infra notes 44-60 and accompanying text. Only the Eighth and Tenth
Circuits have rejected the application of Rule 407 to strict liability actions. See
Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying Service, Inc., 716 F.2d 1322, 1331 (10th Cir. 1983);
Unterburger v. Snow Co., 630 F.2d 599, 603 (8th Cir. 1980); Robbins v. Farmer's
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prove the defective condition of a product in a strict liability action
through the use of evidence of subsequent remedial measures. 7
In accordance with the position taken by the Alaska legislature,
the Alaska Supreme Court, in Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, held
that the policy reasons justifying the exclusion of such evidence in neg-
ligence actions are not applicable in a strict products liability action.8
There is thus a direct conflict between the respective Ninth Circuit
and Alaska positions which could influence the outcome of a case de-
pending on whether the action is filed in state or federal court.
This note will focus on the conflicting federal and Alaska rules
and the policy reasons underlying the respective positions. First, the
note will examine the federal rule. The note will next discuss the
Alaska rule, its origins, and determinant policy considerations which
will be contrasted with the Ninth Circuit approach. Case law constru-
ing and applying the two rules will be considered in explication of the
policy arguments and to suggest bases for criticism.
Finally, the note will focus on the weaknesses of the Alaska pol-
icy and highlight some of the consequences of this rule. Principal
among these problems is the great potential for prejudice to defend-
ants that arises when evidence of subsequent remedial measures is ad-
mitted. Moreover, because the Alaska rule conflicts with the Ninth
Circuit construction of Federal Rules of Evidence 407, plaintiffs likely
will engage in forum shopping.
II. FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 407
Federal Rules of Evidence 407 prohibits the introduction of evi-
dence concerning remedial measures, taken after an accident, which
would have made the event less likely to occur if taken previously, to
prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with an event.
However, the rule does allow evidence of subsequent remedial meas-
ures to prove ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary meas-
ures, if controverted, or for impeachment purposes.9
Union Grain Terminal Assoc., 552 F.2d 788, 793 (8th Cir. 1977). But see Deluryea v.
Wintrop Laboratories, 697 F.2d 222, 228-29 (8th Cir. 1983).
7. ALASKA R. EVID. 407 provides:
[w]hen, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously, would
have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent meas-
ures is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection
with the event. This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of subse-
quent measures when offered for another purpose, such as impeachment or,
if controverted, proving ownership, control, feasibility of precautionary
measures, or defective condition in a products liability action.
8. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 624 P.2d 790, 794 (Alaska 1981).
9. Federal Rules of Evidence 407 states:
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Two primary reasons traditionally have been advanced to justify
the exclusion of remedial measures as proof or an admission of fault.10
First, "the conduct is not in fact an admission since the conduct is
equally consistent with injury by mere accident or through contribu-
tory negligence." 11 As Baron Bramwell stated in Hart v. Lancashire
and Yorkshire Railway Co., 12
people do not furnish evidence against themselves simply by adopt-
ing a new plan in order to prevent the recurrence of an accident. I
think that a proposition to the contrary would be barbarous. It
would be (as I have often had occasion to tell juries) to hold that,
because the world gets wiser as it gets older, therefore it was foolish
before.13
The Federal Rules of Evidence thus reflect the conclusion that subse-
quent remedial measures do not constitute an admission of prior
misconduct.14
This explanation alone would not support the exclusion of evi-
dence under a liberal theory of relevancy because an inference of mis-
conduct still is possible.15 However, the Advisory Committee found
another "and more impressive, ground for exclusion rest[ing] on a so-
cial policy of encouraging people to take, or at least not discouraging
them from taking, steps in furtherance of added safety."16 The crux of
the Advisory Committee's decision to bar such evidence is the belief
that permitting evidence of subsequent remedial measures to come in
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously, would
have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent meas-
ures is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection
with the event. This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of subse-
quent measures when offered for another purpose, such as proving owner-
ship, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted, or
impeachment.
10. FED. R. EVID. advisory committee's note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 225-26 (1973).
11. Id.
12. 21 L.T.R.N.S. 261, 263 (1869).
13. Id., cited in 10 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 407.02, at 151 (1987).
14. The Federal Rules thus seem to acknowledge that a jury is likely to infer a
manufacturer's admission of prior misconduct from the fact that that manufacturer
later undertook remedial measures on that product. The advisory committee found
that the mere fact that a manufacturer took subsequent remedial measures did not
warrant such an inference, and [i]n effect it rejects the suggested inference that fault is
admitted. 56 F.R.D. 183, 226. Thus, the advisory committee refuses to allow the
introduction of such evidence for the purpose of demonstrating negligence or culpable
conduct. Moreover, since the jury is likely to infer an admission of prior misconduct,
evidence of subsequent remedial measures is highly prejudicial. See infra text accom-
panying notes 140-42.




would discourage repairs and deter desirable safety measures.17 This
view is articulated by Wigmore, who states:
An argument of policy has always been invoked to strengthen the
case for exclusion. That argument is that the admission of such
acts, even though theoretically not plainly improper, would be liable
to over-emphasis by the jury, and that it would discourage all own-
ers, even those who had genuinely been careful, from improving the
place or thing that has caused the injury, because they would fear
the evidential use of such acts to their disadvantage; and thus not
only would careful owners refrain from improvements, but even
careless ones, who might have deserved to have the evidence ad-
duced against them, would be refraining from improvements sub-
ject[ing] innocent persons to the risk of the recurrence of the
injury.8
While the rule adopted by the Advisory Committee for the above
reasons disallows evidence of subsequent remedial measures to show
negligence or culpable conduct, the rule does render such evidence ad-
missible in certain cases for other purposes. The rule expressly allows
the admission of evidence of subsequent remedial measures to demon-
strate ownership or control, existence of a duty, and feasibility of pre-
cautionary measures (if controverted) and for impeachment
purposes. 19 Furthermore, it should be emphasized "that this list is not
exclusive, but merely illustrative."20
When evidence of subsequent remedial measures is offered for a
purpose other than to show negligence or culpable conduct, its admis-
sibility is governed by the general rules of relevance 21 and protection
against undue prejudice.22 In addition, the purpose for which it is of-
fered must be controverted. Unless a genuine issue is present, the evi-
dence is automatically excluded.23
17. 10 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 407.02 (1987).
18. Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 321 F.2d 683, 690 (5th Cir.
1963) (citing 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 283, 151-52 (3d ed. 1940)).
19. FED. R. EVID. 407.
20. 10 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 407.02, at 152.
21. Federal Rules of Evidence 401 provides that "'relevant evidence' means evi-
dence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to
the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be with-
out the evidence." Federal Rules of Evidence 402 states that "[a]ll relevant evidence
is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States,
by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court
pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible."
FED. R. EVID. 401, 402.
22. Federal Rules of Evidence 403 embodies a balancing test: "Although rele-
vant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste 6f time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence." FED. R. EvID. 403.
23. FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee's note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 226 (1973).
[Vol. 5:333
EVIDENCE RULE 407
III. ALASKA RULES OF EVIDENCE 407
Alaska Rules of Evidence 407 similarly precludes plaintiffs from
demonstrating negligence or other culpable conduct through the intro-
duction of evidence of subsequent remedial measures. However, in ad-
dition to permitting evidence of later measures to come in for
impeachment purposes or to prove controverted ownership, control,
or feasibility of precautionary measures, the Alaska rule expressly per-
mits plaintiffs to use evidence of subsequent remedial measures to
demonstrate a product's defective condition in a strict liability ac-
tion.24 Thus, while the commentary to Alaska Rule 407 states that the
"rule is modeled on Federal Rule 407,' ' 25 the Alaska rule differs from
the federal rule in that it permits the use of subsequent remedial meas-
ures to prove product defects in strict liability actions. The commen-
tary to Alaska Rule 407 articulates the same justifications and policy
considerations for the exclusionary portion of the rule as furnished by
the federal rules advisory committee. They are: first, to indicate that
the conduct is not an admission; second, to encourage repairs; third, to
avoid prejudice to a cautious defendant since a jury may read more
into the evidence than is warranted. 26 However, the Alaska commen-
tary continues, "unlike most rules that have been promulgated, this
Rule explicitly excepts from the reach of the exclusionary rule the use
of subsequent remedial measures to show a defect in a product. '27
While the Alaska rules committee conceded that "there are few cases
and few scholarly discussions of the applicability of this exclusionary
principle in products liability cases," 28 it believed its innovative ap-
proach was warranted by the differences between a strict products lia-
bility action and the traditional negligence action at which the federal
rule was aimed. To support its position that the reasons for the gen-
eral exclusionary rule do not apply in a products liability action, the
commentary cited Bachner v. Pearson29 which highlights the differ-
ences between the two types of actions:
The focus of attention in strict liability cases is not on the conduct
of the defendant, but rather on the existence of the defective prod-
uct which causes injuries. Liability is attached, as a matter of pol-
icy, on the basis of the existence of a defect rather than on the basis
of the defendant's negligent conduct.30
24. ALAsKA R. EVID. 407. See supra note 7.




29. c479 P.2d 319, 329 (Alaska 1970).
30. ALAsKA R. EvlD. 407 advisory committee's note (citing Bachner v. Pearson,
479 P.2d at 329).
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The promulgators of Alaska Rule 407 thus do not believe that
any of the three grounds traditionally supporting exclusion are appli-
cable in a products liability action. Rather, the committee noted that
"evidence of subsequent repairs or improvements may be highly pro-
bative as to the existence of a defect in a product at the time of an
accident. ' 31 The rules committee thus rejected the traditional position
that such subsequent repairs are not evidence of negligence or culpable
conduct at the time of the accident.
Particular emphasis is placed in the commentary to Alaska Rule
407 on the inapplicability in products liability actions of the second
and third grounds traditionally advanced to justify the exclusionary
policy. The Alaska rule contends that the traditional public policy
rationale of encouraging (or at least not deterring) repairs is inapplica-
ble because of the nature of the products liability actions.32 The evi-
dence rules commentary derives its principal support for this position
from Ault v. International Harvester Co.,33 a 1975 California Supreme
Court case. Ault is the seminal case which admits evidence of subse-
quent remedial measures in strict products liability actions on the
grounds that the policy reasons traditionally supporting exclusion are
simply inapplicable in products liability actions. The case warrants a
detailed examination.
The plaintiff in Ault was injured in an accident involving a
"Scout," a vehicle manufactured by defendant, International Har-
vester.34 The plaintiff alleged that the defective design of the vehicle
caused the accident and sought recovery under theories of strict liabil-
ity, breach of warranty, and negligence. To prove defective design, the
plaintiff offered evidence that the defendant had changed the metal
used in its gearboxes. 35 On appeal, the defendant attacked the admis-
sion of this evidence to prove product defect. Primarily, defendant
argued that the admission of the evidence violated section 1151 of the
California Evidence Code which is virtually identical to Federal Rule
407.36
31. Id.
32. The Alaska rules committee noted, "the rationale of not discouraging repairs
or improvement does not justify excluding this evidence in the products liability case."
Id.
33. 13 Cal. 3d 113, 528 P.2d 1148, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812 (1975).
34. Id. at 116, 528 P.2d at 1149, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 813.
35. Id. The gearbox of the vehicle in question had been manufactured from alu-
minum 380. Plaintiff claimed that this material was defective for the purpose for
which it had been used, since it was insufficiently malleable. At the trial, plaintiff had
introduced evidence that the defendant had later changed the metal it used in its gear-
boxes to a more malleable iron. The jury subsequently awarded plaintiff $700,000. Id.
36. Id. at 117, 528 P.2d at 1150, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 814. California Evidence Code
§ 1151 is similar to Federal Rule 407 and provides, in relevant part, "When, after the
occurrence of an event, remedial or precautionary measures are taken, which, if taken
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The defendant argued that the exclusionary rule should apply be-
cause, while a defendant manufacturer in a strict liability case might
not be blameworthy in a legal sense, the evidence could be used to
indicate that the defendant was blameworthy in a moral sense and
thus guilty of "culpable conduct" within the ambits of section 1151. 37
The defendant also attempted to demonstrate that if culpable conduct
was construed merely to be synonymous with negligence, the phrase
would have no meaning within the context of section 1151. 38 Finally,
the defendant contended that culpable conduct encompassed strict lia-
bility because a plaintiff may recover if he establishes the product was
defective, and he need not show any breach of care by defendant.39
Despite defendant's arguments, the California Supreme Court,
per Justice Mosk, declined to find admission of the evidence a viola-
tion of section 1151. 40 The court based its conclusion on two grounds.
First, the court found that the language and legislative history of sec-
tion 1151 demonstrated that strict products liability actions were not
within the exclusionary scope of the rule. The court noted that "sec-
tion 1151 by its own terms excludes evidence of subsequent remedial
or precautionary measures only when such evidence is offered to prove
negligence or culpable conduct."' 41 The court found that demonstrat-
ing negligence or culpability is not a necessary element of a strict lia-
bility action. Thus, the court's survey of the history and purposes of
previously, would have tended to make the event less likely to occur, evidence of such
subsequent measures is inadmissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in con-
nection with the event." CAL. EvID. CODE § 1151 (West 1966).
37. Id at 118, 528 P.2d at 1151, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 815. Regarding this point, the
court noted that if the legislature had intended to include strict liability cases within
section 1151, "it would have used an expression less related to and consistent with
affirmative fault than 'culpable conduct.'" Id
38. Id. The court dismissed this argument in a footnote, claiming that there were
"types of faulty conduct other than negligence which are encompassed within 'culpa-
ble conduct,' such as wanton and reckless misconduct." Id. n.3. See infra text accom-
panying note 87.
39. Id at 118, 528 P.2d at 1150, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 814 (citing Greenman v. Yuba
Power Prod., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62-63, 377 P.2d 897, 900-01, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700-01
(1963)).
40. Id. at 117-18, 528 P.2d at 1150, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 814. The court noted:
The language and the legislative history of section 1151 demonstrate that the
section is designed for cases involving negligence or culpable conduct on the
part of the defendant, rather than to those circumstances in which a manu-
facturer is alleged to be strictly liable for placing a defective product on the
market. Furthermore, we are not persuaded that the rationale which im-
pelled the legislature to adopt the rule set forth in the section for cases in-
volving negligence is applicable to suits founded upon strict liability, and we
therefore decline to judicially extend the application of the section to litiga-
tion founded upon that theory.
Id.
41. Id. at 118, 528 P.2d at 1150, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 814.
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section 1151 led it to conclude that the rule had not been intended to
apply in strict products liability actions.
Second, and most importantly, Ault's holding rests on the Califor-
nia Supreme Court's belief that the public policy rationale central to
section 1151 of the California Evidence Code simply does not carry
much weight in the context of a strict products liability action. The
court recognized that admitting evidence of subsequent repairs to
prove negligence might deter a person from making repairs after the
occurrence of an accident. However, the court believed that:
When the context is transformed from a typical negligence setting
to the modern products liability field, however, the... "public pol-
icy" assumptions justifying this evidentiary rule are no longer valid.
The contemporary corporate mass producer of goods, the normal
products liability defendant, manufactures tens of thousands of
units of goods; it is manifestly unrealistic to suggest that such a
producer will forego making improvements in its product, and risk
innumerable additional lawsuits and the attendant adverse effect
upon its public image, simply because evidence of adoption of such
improvement may be admitted in an action founded on strict liabil-
ity for recovery on an injury that preceded the improvement. 42
Thus, the court found that rather than advancing the policy goals
which section 1151 was intended to further, extending the rule to
products liability actions would in fact undermine the purpose of strict
liability and serve "merely as a shield against potential liability." 43
Ault has become the leading case holding that in a strict products lia-
bility action, evidence of subsequent remedial measures may be intro-
duced to show the defective condition of a product on the ground that
the policy justifications advanced to support an exclusionary rule are
inapplicable in products liability actions.
The rationale underlying the Ault decision has been followed in
two circuits. 44 The Tenth Circuit decision in Herndon v. Seven Bar
Flying Service, Inc. is noteworthy for its detailed consideration and
evaluation of Rule 407.45 Herndon involved an action brought by the
widows of persons killed in an airplane crash against the manufacturer
42. Id. at 120, 528 P.2d at 1151-52, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 815-16. This passage is
cited in the commentary to Alaska Rules of Evidence 407. The Alaska commentary
also noted that the "manufacturer of a product makes more of a business judgment
than a humanitarian gesture" in deciding whether to make repairs so that there was
no need to protect a manufacturer making such a humanitarian gesture from unwar-
ranted inferences. ALASKA R. EvID. 407 advisory committee's note.
43. Id. at 1152.
44. See Unterberger v. Snow Co., Inc., 630 F.2d 599, 603 (8th Cir. 1980); Robbins
v. Farmer's Union Grain Terminal Ass'n, 552 F.2d 788, 793 (8th Cir. 1977); but see
Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying Service, Inc., 716 F.2d 1322, 1331 (10th Cir. 1983);
DeLuryea v. Wintrop Laboratories, 697 F.2d 222, 228-29 (8th Cir. 1983); see infra
note 60.
45. 716 F.2d 1322, 1326-30 (10th Cir. 1983).
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of the allegedly defectively designed aircraft. 46 The Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit concluded that the trial court had correctly con-
strued Rule 407 of the Federal Rules of Evidence by permitting the
plaintiff to demonstrate the defective design of the trim switch which
had allegedly caused the crash through introduction of remedial meas-
ures subsequently undertaken by the aircraft manufacturer. 47 The
Tenth Circuit undertook a lengthy survey of the purposes of Federal
Rules of Evidence 407 before concluding that the policy reasons tradi-
tionally advanced for an exclusionary rule were inapplicable to prod-
uct manufacturers in strict liability actions.48 The court first noted
that the purpose behind 5trict liability, with its focus on the product at
the time of manufacture, would be frustrated by an exclusionary
rule.49 Since the responsibility for a defective design in a strict liability
action is on the manufacturer, regardless of the reasonableness of the
manufacturer's conduct at the time, "[e]mploying Rule 407 to exclude
evidence of the product's safety that is relevant and not prejudicial, as
determined under rules 401 and 403, would thwart the policies that
underlie strict liability by an illogical imposition of a negligence-based
rule of evidence."' 50
The Tenth Circuit also enumerated several reasons why it found
the rationale unpersuasive that admitting evidence of subsequent re-
medial measures would have the unfortunate consequence of discour-
aging manufacturers from making repairs. First, the court reiterated
the notion that it would be unrealistic to assume that manufacturers
would risk countless future lawsuits simply to preclude the possible
use of these later remedial measures as evidence against them.51
Herndon also stressed that insurers would certainly object if their in-
sured manufacturers refused to undertake remedial measures. 52 Addi-
tionally, the court noted that both governmental agencies and juries
contemplating damage claims would serve as a sufficient deterrent to a
manufacturer's possible decision not to repair.5 3 Finally, Herndon
pointed out that "there is no evidence which shows that manufactur-
ers even know about the evidentiary rule or change their behavior be-
cause of it.' ' 54
46. Id. at 1324.
47. Id. at 1325. Piper had modified the design of the trim switch following the
accident, and it also issued a service bulletin, introduced into evidence by plaintiffs,
instructing owners of such aircraft to modify their switches. Id. at 1327.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. The court completely neglected the possible prejudicial impact of such
evidence. See infra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
5 1. Id.





Herndon also dismissed defendants' arguments concerning the
possibility that a jury might be confused by evidence of post-accident
remedies. Since "such evidence is unquestionably 'relevant,' as that
term is defined by Rule 401, there is no justification for excluding it
under Rule 407 where the trial court determines that the potential of
the evidence to confuse or prejudice the jury does not substantially
outweigh the probative value."'5 5 Evidently, the court found the bal-
ance sufficiently satisfied to justify admitting the evidence. Thus, the
Tenth Circuit, like the California Supreme Court in Ault, construed
Rule 407 as permitting the admission of the evidence.
In Robbins v. Farmer's Union Grain Terminal Association, 5 6 the
Eighth Circuit also followed the Ault approach. The court upheld an
award of damages to plaintiff on alternative theories of negligence,
breach of implied warranty, and strict liability, over defendant's objec-
tion, among others, that the trial judge had improperly permitted
plaintiff to introduce evidence of subsequent remedial measures in con-
nection with the strict liability count.57 The court, invoking Ault,
found the policy underlying Rule 407 of not deterring subsequent re-
medial measures inapplicable in strict liability actions.5 8 Robbins also
rejected defendant's relevancy challenge to the admission of such evi-
dence.5 9 Thus, the Eighth Circuit found that the admission of evi-
dence of subsequent remedial measures in a strict liability case did not
violate Rule 407. 0
The Alaska rules committee has found the Ault rationale equally
persuasive. The case is cited at length as authority for Alaska's unique
Rule 407 and its sanction of the use of evidence of subsequent remedial
measures to demonstrate a prior defective condition. Defendants in
Alaska have challenged the Alaska policy on several occasions. 61
However, courts have upheld the admission of the evidence by invok-
ing Alaska Rule 407 and continuing to follow Ault. Caterpillar Trac-
tor Co. v. Beck 62 is one example. In Beck, a widow brought a
wrongful death action against the manufacturer of a vehicle which she
55. Id.
56. 552 F.2d 788 (8th Cir. 1977).
57. Id. at 792.
58. Id. at 793.
59. Id. at 793-94.
60. See also Unterberger v. Snow Co., Inc., 630 F.2d 599, 603 (8th Cir. 1980).
But see DeLuryea v. Wintrop Laboratories, 697 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1983) (holding that
in a failure-to-warn case involving a prescription drug, evidence of subsequent reme-
dial measures was inadmissible, for the issues involved in such a case were essentially
the same as those in failure-to-warn negligence cases, where such evidence was inad-
missible). Id. at 228-29.
61. Dura Corp. v. Harned, 703 P.2d 396 (Alaska 1985); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v.
Beck, 624 P.2d 790 (Alaska 1980).
62. 624 P.2d 790 (Alaska 1980).
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alleged was responsible for her husband's death.63 Judgment was en-
tered in favor of the widow, whereupon the manufacturer appealed
and the widow cross-appealed. 64 At a conference preceding the new
trial, Judge Warren Taylor made several evidentiary rulings which re-
sulted in an appeal to the supreme court.65 The evidentiary ruling
which is important for purposes of the present discussion concerns the
admissibility of evidence of post-injury accidents and design changes. 66
The supreme court affirmed the trial court since "Alaska Rule of Evi-
dence 407, which provides that, in a products liability action, evidence
of subsequent measures is admissible toward the feasibility of alterna-
tive designs as well as defective condition. ' 67 The court noted that
since the rule expressly permitted the use of subsequent remedial
measures to show a defective condition, the evidence was properly ad-
mitted. In refusing to disturb the trial court rulings, the supreme
court noted, "We have consistently declined to rewrite the rules of
practice from the bench, and decline to do so here.... Rule changes
are more appropriately accomplished by amendment upon recommen-
dation of the rules committee, the bench, and the bar."'68
The supreme court described the Alaska rule as consistent with
the policy followed in the majority of jurisdictions, 69 and then enunci-
ated the public policy rationale first advanced in Ault for admitting the
evidence.70 The supreme court also rejected the manufacturer's chal-
lenge that the evidence was irrelevant, and therefore inadmissible,
under Alaska Rules of Evidence 402.71 The court stated that "evi-
dence about the character of the product, as reflected in subsequent
63. Id. at 792. Plaintiff's husband was operating a front-end loader which rolled
over an embankment and killed him. Plaintiff alleged that the loader was defective
because it did not have a rollover protective shield-an overhead protective canopy
designed to withstand and reduce the risk of a rollover, thus protecting the operator
from being injured. Id.
64. Id. at 790.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 793. The trial court had held the evidence admissible toward "(a) the
dangerous or defective condition of the 944 front-end loader; (b) causation; (c) the
feasibility of alternative designs; and (d) to impeach various contentions of Caterpillar
regarding the safety of the loader." Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See infra note 84 for a contradiction of this description.
70. Beck, 624 P.2d at 794.
71. ALASKA R. EvID. 402. Alaska Rules of Evidence 402 provides:
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Con-
stitution of the United States or of this state, by enactments of the Alaska
legislature, by these rules, or by other rules adopted by the Alaska Supreme
Court. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.
See infra note 123.
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modifications or accidents, is highly probative in strict liability cases
and therefore is not excludable on relevancy grounds. ' '72
Dura Corp. v. Harned73 is a more recent example of the admissi-
bility of subsequent remedial measures in products liability cases in
Alaska. In Dura, the supreme court again refused to disturb the trial
court's evidentiary rulings regarding the admissibility of subsequent
remedial measures, since "in a products liability action, evidence of
subsequent remedial measures is admissible to prove the feasibility of
alternative designs as well as to prove a defective condition."' 74 The
court permitted the plaintiff to prove that the manufacturer had at-
tempted to take remedial measures following the accident, on the
ground that evidence of subsequent repairs or improvement may be
highly probative as to the existence of a defect in a product at the time
of an accident. 75 Thus, manufacturers being sued in Alaska state
courts can continue to expect to be confronted with evidence of any
subsequent remedial measures that they may have undertaken as
"proof" that their product was defective at the time of manufacture.
IV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT REJECTION OF A ULT AND ITS PROGENY
The Ninth Circuit in Gauthier v. AMF, Inc.,76 held that Federal
Rules of Evidence 407 is applicable in a strict liability case alleging
defective design, thus refuting Ault and thereby conflicting directly
with Alaska Rule 407 and the cases purporting to apply that rule. In
Gauthier, the plaintiff sustained injuries while using a snow thrower
manufactured by defendant AMF and sued under a strict liability in
tort theory based upon three different design defects. 77 Gauthier had
placed his hand inside the discharge chute of the running thrower in
an attempt to unclog snow that got caught in the machine. 7 To sub-
stantiate his defective design claims, Gauthier brought into court a
1984 model snow thrower to compare to the 1971 model he alleged
72. Beck, 624 P.2d at 794.
73. Dura Corp. v. Harned, 703 P.2d 396 (Alaska 1985). This case involved a suit
by an employee injured in the explosion of a portable air tank manufactured by de-
fendant. Plaintiff alleged that the manufacturer was liable under both a negligence
and a strict liability in tort theory and was permitted to introduce evidence of subse-
quent remedial measures taken by the manufacturer in connection with the strict lia-
bility count. Plaintiff prevailed and was awarded compensatory damages.
74. Id at 411.
75. Id
76. 788 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1986).
77. Id at 635. Gauthier alleged failure to provide adequate warning, failure to
incorporate "deadman" control devices, and failure to employ a discharge chute suit




was the cause of his injuries. He thereby informed the jury of subse-
quent remedial design changes undertaken by the industry.79 The
Ninth Circuit found that the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Montana had erred by allowing the plaintiff to introduce this
highly prejudicial evidence and, thus, reversed and remanded the case
for new trial.80
As the court of appeals noted, "Rule 407 states that subsequent
remedial measures are 'not admissible to prove negligence or culpable
conduct in connection with the event.' The question ... is whether
conduct that results in strict liability should be considered 'culpable
conduct' under the rule."81 Gauthier, in contrast to Ault and Beck,
answered this question in the affirmative. The court of appeals recog-
nized that while Ault found the public policy considerations of Federal
Rules of Evidence 407 inapplicable in strict product liability cases,
"most Circuits have come to the opposite conclusion and held that
there is no practical difference between strict liability and negligence in
design cases and the public policy rationale to encourage remedial
measures remains the same."' 2 Gauthier, following the majority
trend, held the "reasoning in those cases to be persuasive and
adopt[ed] the position that Rule 407 applies to strict liability cases." 83
Since Gauthier accepts the rationale proffered by other circuits, some
of these decisions will be examined in depth below.
V. CRITICISM OF THE A ULT/ALASKA APPROACH
Despite contrary assertions by the Alaska Supreme Court in
Beck 84 the Ault/Alaska Rule 407 approach has not been followed in
the majority of circuits and has often been the subject of extensive
criticism. This section will highlight, by category, some of the flaws in
the logic underlying the decision not to extend the general exclusion-
ary policy to strict liability actions.
A. Strict Liability as "Culpable Conduct"
While the majority in Ault rejected the manufacturer's argument
that "culpable conduct" subsumed the conduct of a manufacturer held
79. Id. at 636.
80. Id.
81. Id. (citing FED. R. EVID. 407).
82. Id. at 637. See supra note 4.
83. Id. at 637.
84. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 624 P.2d 790, 793-94 (Alaska 1981). The
Beck court asserted that Alaska "Rule 407 is consistent with the majority of jurisdic-
tions. It admits evidence that is highly probative of the existence of a defect, which is
the essence of a strict liability action for a defective product." Id. However, the ma-
jority of jurisdictions do not use this approach. See supra note 4.
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strictly liable,85 there is authority to the contrary. The legislative his-
tory and commentary to Rule 407 does not provide a definitive resolu-
tion to this question. It is certain, however, that Congress intended
that courts rely on common law principles in filling the gaps left after
enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence.8 6
Justice Clarke's dissent in Ault argued that "[c]ulpable conduct
includes conduct breaching a legal duty. Because a plaintiff seeking
recovery on a product liability theory must prove the defendant
breached his legal duty not to place a defective product in the stream
of commerce, [the exclusionary rule] is applicable to [strict liability
actions]."87 Justice Clarke also derived support for the position from
the definition of "culpable" in Black's Law Dictionary."8 In Black's
Law Dictionary, "culpable" is defined as "blamable, censurable, in-
volving the breach of a legal duty or the commission of fault. That
which is deserving of moral blame."819 Thus, the definition of "culpa-
ble" embraces both moral fault and the breach of a legal duty.
Strict liability is premised on the theory that a manufacturer has a
legal duty to prevent a defect capable of causing injury.90 As the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts explains, "one who sells any product in a
defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer
or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused .... "9 1 Under a strict liability theory, it is a breach of duty to
manufacture a defective, unreasonably dangerous product. Since an
excellent argument can thus be made that conduct for which a manu-
facturer is strictly liable can be deemed culpable conduct within the
meaning of Federal Rules of Evidence 407, "the result should be no
different [in strict liability or negligence] on policy grounds as long as
strict liability is not distinguishable on some other ground."92
85. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
86. Cann v. Ford Motor Co., 658 F.2d 54, 60 (2d Cir. 1981) (citing Werner v.
Upjohn Co., Inc., 628 F.2d 848, 856 (4th Cir. 1980); S. SALTSBURG & K. REDDEN,
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 411-13 (1975)).
87. Ault, 528 P.2d at 1155 (Clarke, J., dissenting).
88. Id. As Justice Clarke noted, while the definition of culpable "connotes moral
blameworthiness or moral fault.., the definition is not restricted to the latter concept,
and clearly includes legal blameworthiness and legal fault." Id.
89. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 341 (5th ed. 1979). This definition explicitly sub-
stantiates defendant's claim in Ault that "culpable" encompasses morally blamewor-
thy conduct, which claim was summarily dismissed by the court. See supra notes 37-
38 and accompanying text.
90. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900-01 (1963).
91. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(l) (1965).
92. Werner v. Upjohn Co., Inc., 628 F.2d 848, 857 (4th Cir. 1980).
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B. Differences Between Strict Liability and Negligence Are
Irrelevant for Purposes of Policy Goals of Rule 407
As Gauthier noted,93 there is substantial authority94 supporting
the proposition that the differences between an action premised on
strict liability in tort and one sounding in negligence are insignificant
in terms of the policy of Rule 407, Ault or Beck notwithstanding. In
Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 95 the Seventh Circuit explored the
differences between negligence and strict products liability actions.
The plaintiff in Flaminio was rendered a paraplegic after he was in-
volved in an accident while riding on his new motorcycle manufac-
tured by defendant Honda Motor Co. 96 He alleged that the accident
was caused by the defective design of the motorcycle, or alternatively,
from the manufacturer's failure to warn of certain dangerous propensi-
ties of the motorcycle. 97 The trial court found the plaintiff negligent
and thus seventy percent responsible for the accident himself.98 Plain-
tiff appealed this decision and charged that the trial court had erred in
failing to give a strict liability instruction and that Federal Rules of
Evidence 407 was inapplicable to such strict products liability ac-
tions.99 In reaching the merits, the Seventh Circuit considered the dis-
tinctions between strict liability and negligence. While acknowledging
that certain differences existed between the two types of actions, Judge
Posner's opinion for the court found them irrelevant for the purposes
of that particular action. He specifically noted the similarity between
defect in design °' and negligence suits:
Strict liability is something of a misnomer in products cases. There
is liability only if a product is defective or unreasonably dangerous,
and the concepts of "defect" and "unreasonableness" bring into
play factors of cost and risk similar to those that determine negli-
gence, an objective standard that is independent of what the particu-
lar defendant knew or could have done .... As one court said
recently, "in a defective design case, there is no practical difference
93. Gauthier, 788 F.2d at 637.
94. See Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 733 F.2d 463, 469 (7th Cir. 1984);
Cann v. Ford Motor Co., 658 F.2d 54, 60 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 960
(1982); Werner v. Upjohn Co., Inc., 628 F.2d 848, 857 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1080 (1981).
95. 733 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1984).
96. Id. at 465.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 467-68.
100. Both Beck; supra note 63, and Ault, supra note 35, involved allegations of




between strict liability and negligence. The test for an 'unreasona-
bly dangerous' condition is equivalent to a negligence standard of
reasonableness." 10 1
Thus, the court held that the trial judge's failure to give azstrict liabil-
ity instruction was unlikely to constitute reversible error.102
While Flaminio may oversimplify somewhat the distinction be-
tween products liability actions sounding in negligence and those
under a strict liability theory, as the Second Circuit noted in Cann v.
Ford Motor Co., 1 03 "no distinction between the two (negligence and
strict products liability causes of action) justifies the admission of evi-
dence of subsequent remedial measures in strict products liability
actions."1°4
The differences between the two sorts of actions are not important
for the purposes of Rule 407 and the policy goals it is designed to
further. The majority of circuits applying the rule to strict liability are
correct.'05 Rule 407 was enacted so that manufacturers would not be
deterred from undertaking subsequent repairs or improvements on
their product. If this reasoning is equally applicable to strict products
liability actions, then the policy behind Rule 407 would be thwarted
by permitting plaintiffs suing in strict liability to introduce such
evidence.106
In Ault, the California Supreme Court based its holding primarily
on the supposition that "it is manifestly unrealistic to suggest that
such a producer will forego making improvements in its product, and
risk innumerable additional law suits and the attendant adverse effect
upon its public image, simply because evidence of adoption of such
improvements may be admitted in an action founded on strict liability
for recovery on an injury that preceded the improvement." 10 7 Both
the commentary to Alaska Rule 407108 and the Alaska Supreme
Court's holding in Beck 109 explicitly adopt this assumption.
101. Flaminio, 733 F.2d at 467 (citing Birchfield v. International Harvester Co.,
726 F.2d 1131, 1139 (6th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted)).
102. Id.; see also Bolm v. Triumph Corp., 422 N.Y.S.2d 969, 973-74 (1969) (hold-
ing that Federal Rules of Evidence 407 applied to strict liability defect in design cases
because the standard in such cases is essentially the same as the reasonable man negli-
gence standard).
103. 658 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1981).
104. Id. at 60.
105. See supra note 4.
106. See Werner v. Upjohn Co., Inc., 628 F.2d 848, 860 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. de-
nied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981). The Fourth Circuit noted, "to find such an exception
would subvert the policy goals.., of... rule 407...." Id.
107. Ault, 528 P.2d 1152; see supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 32.
109. See supra notes 62-72 and accompanying text.
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While the Ault court justifies its holding on this assumption, "the
Ault court offers no basis for distinguishing between the two theo-
ries." 110 In Cann v. Ford Motor Co., the Second Circuit rejected the
California Supreme Court's attempt to distinguish the applicability of
the public policy goals behind the exclusionary rule in negligence and
in strict liability actions. The plaintiffs in Cann sued Ford Motor
Company for injuries sustained when their Ford-manufactured car,
which Mr. Cann had put in "park" and left running, shifted suddenly
into reverse, causing injury to Mrs. Cann. 111 On appeal, the plaintiffs
alleged that the trial court had erred in excluding evidence they sought
to introduce concerning subsequent remedial measures undertaken by
Ford.112 The Second Circuit found the policy considerations justifying
the exclusionary rule of Federal Rules of Evidence 407 equally appli-
cable in strict liability actions, notwithstanding the focus on the de-
fendant's conduct in negligence actions and the exclusive concern with
the product in strict liability.113 The different focus certainly did not
warrant a variant application of the policy goals of Rule 407 to strict
liability and negligence. As the Second Circuit noted:
[T]he defendant must pay the judgment in both situations, regard-
less of where the jury's attention is focused when they found against
him. Since the policy underlying Rule 407 not to discourage per-
sons from taking remedial measures is relevant to defendants sued
under either theory, we do not see the significance of the distinction.
A potential defendant must be equally concerned regardless of the
theoretical rubric .... 114
In Werner v. Upjohn Co., Inc., the Fourth Circuit questioned the
validity of a distinction between the applicability of Rule 407 to negli-
gence and strict liability in terms of public policy:
It is difficult to understand why this policy should apply any differ-
ently where the complaint is based on strict liability as well as negli-
gence. From a defendant's point of view it is the fact that the
evidence may be used against him which will inhibit subsequent re-
pairs or improvements. It makes no difference to the defendant on
what theory the evidence is admitted; his inclination to make subse-
quent improvements will be similarly repressed. The reasoning be-
hind this asserted distinction we believe to be hypertechnical, for
the suit is against the manufacturer, not against the product.' 1 5
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit has noted that the "assumption in
[Rule 407] that it might have a deterrent effect is not demonstrably
110. Werner, 628 F.2d at 858.
111. Cann, 658 F.2d 54, 56 (2d Cir. 1981). Plaintiff claimed that the gearshift was
constructed in such a manner that the car could appear to be in "park" even if not.
112. Id. at 57-58.
113. Id. at 60.
114. Id. (emphasis in original).
115. 628 F.2d 848, 857 (4th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981).
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inapplicable to manufacturers upon whom strict liability is im-
posed." 116 Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd. also held that since pol-
icy considerations underlying Rule 407 are as pertinent in strict
liability as in negligence actions, a strict liability plaintiff should be
precluded from introducing evidence of subsequent remedial meas-
ures.117 Judge Posner recognizes that in certain strict liability cases,
the application of Rule 407 would be academic. The defendant would
have no incentive, regardless of Rule 407, to take remedial measures
because the accident was unavoidable.118 However, "[e]specially in a
product case, the accident may have been readily avoidable either by
eliminating some defect or by warning the consumer of some inherent
danger, and in such a case failure to apply Rule 407 might deter subse-
quent remedial measures just as much as in a negligence case." 119
Thus, since a plaintiff could make the same use of the evidence in a
strict products liability action as in a negligence action, and since it
will be used against the defendant manufacturer who must pay the
judgment in both types of cases, from a policy standpoint, no valid
reason exists for according differential treatment to the two types of
actions. The Ault/Alaska approach really does not substantiate its
view that strict liability and negligence ought to be treated differently
from the standpoint of public policy. While both Ault 120 and
Herndon 1 21 questioned the assumption that the admission of such evi-
dence in fact would dissuade manufacturers from making such repairs,
courts are increasingly questioning the validity of the distinction be-
tween negligence and strict liability for the purposes of Rule 407 and
choosing not to risk dissuading manufacturers from taking subsequent
remedial measures.
C. Lack of Relevance of Subsequent Remedial Measures
The commentary to both Alaska Rules of Evidence 407 and Fed-
eral Rule 407 provides that evidence of subsequent remedial measures
does not constitute an admission of prior fault, since such conduct (the
taking of remedial measures) is equally consistent with injury by acci-
dent or through the plaintiff's own fault. 122 Since subsequent remedial
measures are not necessarily indicative of prior fault, such evidence
116. Grenada Steel Indus., Inc. v. Alabama Oxygen Co., Inc., 695 F.2d 883, 887
(5th Cir. 1983). However, the Grenada decision was based primarily on a relevancy
rationale. See infra text accompanying notes 130-32.
117. Flaminio, 733 F.2d at 469-70.
118. Id. at 469.
119. Id. at 470.
120. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 11-14, 26 and accompanying text.
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could be excluded on the ground that it is not relevant. 123 The Fourth
Circuit held in Werner v. Upjohn Co., Inc. that the lack of probative
value of evidence concerning subsequent remedial measures justified
excluding such evidence. The court assumed that:
the product [was] defective, and thus overlook[ed] the situation
where the product is not defective but could be made better. The
manufacturer who undertakes precautionary measures in this set-
ting will face the risk of liability for an injury caused by an earlier
nondefective version of the product based on evidence of his subse-
quent act which made the product safer but in no way supports an
inference that the initial version of the product was defective.124
The Fifth Circuit also considered at length the potential relevance
of subsequent remedial measures in strict products liability actions in
Grenada Steel Industries, Inc. v. Alabama Oxygen Co., Inc. 125 Gre-
nada Steel sued Alabama Oxygen following the occurrence of a fire in
one of Grenada Steel's plants. 126 Plaintiffs charged that a gas leak
caused the fire and that the leak resulted from the defective condition
of a valve on the cylinder in which defendant had delivered the gas to
plaintiffs. 127 Plaintiffs had attempted to prove that the valve was de-
fective through the introduction of evidence that the design of the
valve in question subsequently had been altered. 128 The Fifth Circuit
believed that the policy behind Federal Rule 407 was applicable in
strict products liability actions.1 29 However, its decision to exclude
the evidence was based chiefly "on the proposition that evidence of
subsequent repairs or changes has little relevance to whether the prod-
uct in question was defective at some previous time." 130 The Grenada
court was concerned that members of the legal profession were not
particularly well suited to explore the reasons why a manufacturer
made a change in a product and, thus, to evaluate whether such a
change indicated prior wrongdoing:
A priori judgments concerning why manufacturers do or do not al-
ter their products, made by such dubious experts as judges, lawyers,
and law professors, suffer from excessive reliance on logical deduc-
tion and surmise without the benefit of evidence of industry practice
123. FED. R. EvID. 401, 402. See supra note 21. Similarly, Alaska Rules of Evi-
dence 401 provides: "Relevant evidence means evidence having any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Alaska Rules of
Evidence 402 provides for the exclusion of any evidence that is not relevant. See supra
note 71.
124. Werner, 628 F.2d at 857.
125. 695 F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1983).
126. Id. at 885.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
130. 695 F.2d at 887.
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or economic factors. It seems to us, with no greater expertise than
like-trained lawyers and judges, that changes in design or in manu-
facturing process might be made after an accident for a number of
different reasons: simply to avoid another injury, as a sort of admis-
sion of error, because a better way has been discovered, or to imple-
ment an idea or plan conceived before the'accident.
13 1
Therefore, the court deemed that admission of evidence of subsequent
changes in design in the valve was erroneous. 132
The relevancy rationale articulated in Grenada Steel has not been
uniformly accepted. 133 The commentary to both Federal Rules of Evi-
dence 407 and Alaska Rules of Evidence 407 notes that while subse-
quent remedial measures are not admissions of prior misconduct,
under a liberal theory of relevancy, this ground alone would not sup-
port exclusion because the inference is still permissible.134 However,
even if deemed relevant, evidence could still be excluded under a bal-
ancing test in which the probativity of the evidence is weighed against
the factors of undue prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury,
and waste of time under Rule 403.135 Thus, even if one were to reject
the rationale proffered in Werner and admit the evidence on the
grounds that it is probative and thus relevant, the balancing test still
provides a mechanism whereby the admission of the evidence could be
challenged.
In Beck, the Alaska Supreme Court rejected the defendant manu-
facturer's argument that evidence of later design changes was irrele-
vant and therefore inadmissible.136 The defendant manufacturer,
131. Id. at 887-88; but see Herndon, supra notes 44-55 and accompanying text.
132. 695 F.2d at 888.
133. See, e.g., Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying Service, Inc., 716 F.2d 1322, discussed
supra at notes 44-55. Herndon stated, "[tihe Fifth Circuit's relevancy rationale... is
unconvincing. Under Rule 401, evidence is 'relevant' if it has any tendency to make
the existence of a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
Evidence of subsequent repairs is thus relevant because a possible inference the jury
can draw is that the product at issue was defective before defendant implemented the
remedial measures." Id. at 1328.
134. ALASKA R. EvID. 407 advisory committee's note; FED. R. EvID. 407.
135. FED. R. EVID. 403. See supra note 22. Similarly, Alaska Rules of Evidence
403 provides, "[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence." ALASKA R. EVID. 403.
136. Beck, 624 P.2d 790, 793. Defendant had attempted to rely on the court's
statement in footnote 52 of Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska
1979), that design defects were to be "measured by the knowledge and information
which existed when the product left the manufacturer's hands." Id. The court dis-
missed this earlier pronouncement (of footnote 52) as "dictum." Id. Accordingly,
"its meaning should be limited to the principle that a substantial change in the prod-
uct after it leaves the manufacturer's hands will ordinarily defeat a claim based on
strict tort liability." Id.
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however, claimed that the criteria of Alaska Rule of Evidence 403 pro-
vided an alternative ground for the exclusion of the evidence, since the
evidence was more prejudicial than probative. 137 The supreme court
addressed this issue in a footnote, stating that the "[e]xclusion of prej-
udicial evidence under Rule 403 is discretionary with the trial
court."13 8 Since no specific evidence had been proffered, the court
found it "impossible" to rule whether there had been an abuse of dis-
cretion. 139 The Alaska Supreme Court thus did not preclude the pos-
sibility that evidence of subsequent remedial measures could be
challenged in the future for its prejudicial impact.
D. Prejudicial Impact of Evidence of Subsequent Remedial
Measures and Dangers of Forum Shopping
There is abundant authority that the prejudicial nature of evi-
dence concerning subsequent remedial measures furnishes an in-
dependent ground for its exclusion. 14° The commentary to Alaska
Rules of Evidence 407 and Federal Rules of Evidence 407 implicitly
recognizes that although the conduct does not in fact constitute an
admission, juries will be likely to construe the evidence as such and
there is thus a (rebuttable) presumption that the evidence should be
excluded.141 Moreover, as the Seventh Circuit aptly reasoned in
Flaminio, "[ilt is only because juries are believed to overreact to evi-
dence of subsequent remedial measures that the admissibility of such
evidence could deter defendants from taking such measures." 142
Thus, in a sense, the whole policy of Rule 407 flows from the perceived
prejudicial impact of such evidence.
The Alaska rule's prejudicial impact on defendants creates an-
other related problem. Because discrepancy between the Ninth Cir-
cuit and the Alaska rule could effect the outcome of a dispute,
plaintiffs are likely to engage in forum shopping. While-state substan-
tive law applies in diversity suits, 143 in matters of procedure, such as
the admissibility of evidence, federal rules apply. 144 Federal Rules of
137. Id
138. Id. at n.6.
139. IdL
140. See, ag., Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 733 F.2d 463, 471 (7th Cir.
1984); Cann v. Ford Motor Co., 658 F.2d 54, 60 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
960 (1982); Baumann v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 621 F.2d 230, 233 (6th
Cir. 1980); Smyth v. Upjohn Co., Inc., 529 F.2d 803, 804 (2d Cir. 1975).
141. See supra notes 13-14, 27 and accompanying text. -
142. Flaminio, 733 F.2d at 471.
143. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
144. Grenada Steel Indus., Inc. v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883, 885 (5th
Cir. 1983). See also Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d at 471-72; but see Moe v.
Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet Aviation, 727 F.2d 917, 932 (10th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 853 (1984) (holding that "when state courts have interpreted Rule
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Evidence 1101 explicitly states that the Federal Rules of Evidence are
to be applied in all federal courts. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins held
that, while the federal courts must apply state substantive law in diver-
sity actions, federal procedural law would control.1 45 In Hanna v.
Plumer146 the Court noted that "the twin aims of the Erie Rule
[were]: discouragement of forum shopping and avoidance of inequita-
ble administration of the laws."147 Since Alaska Rules of Evidence
407 allows plaintiffs to introduce evidence which can be quite damag-
ing to defendants, plaintiffs will almost certainly favor suing in state
courts, while defendants will want to remove to federal court, in order
to take advantage of the Ninth Circuit construction of Federal Rule
407 as applicable in strict products liability actions. As noted above,
evidence of subsequerit remedial measures can have a very prejudicial
impact on defendants. Conversely, it will be to a plaintiff's advantage
to sue in a jurisdiction where the evidence is deemed admissible. Since
the Alaska rule of evidence directly conflicts with the exclusionary in-
terpretation of Rule 407 in the Ninth Circuit, the potential of parties
engaging in forum shopping remains high as long as the discrepancy
exists.
VI. CONCLUSION
Alaska Rules of Evidence 407 conflicts directly with the interpre-
tation of Federal Rules of Evidence 407 followed in the majority of the
federal courts of appeals, including the Ninth Circuit. The rationale
with which Alaska has attempted to draw a distinction between negli-
gence and strict products liability actions is flawed and is not sup-
ported by the policy underlying Rule 407. The policy of the rule will
be severely undermined if Alaska continues to admit evidence of sub-
sequent remedial measures in strict liability actions. The differences
between negligence and strict liability are insignificant, especially in a
defective design action, in terms of the policy of Rule 407. Moreover,
with application of the Alaska rule, defendants are faced with preju-
dice as a matter of course in Alaska state courts. In view of the con-
flict of the Alaska rule with the Ninth Circuit as well as the majority
of federal jurisdictions, and the dangers of forum shopping which arise
therefrom, Alaska should fall in line with the majority of state and
407 or its equivalent state counterpart, the question of whether subsequent remedial
measures are excluded from evidence is a matter of state policy." Thus, in the Tenth
Circuit, state law would control in the event of a conflict between state and federal
policy with respect to Rule 407.
145. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
146. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
147. Id. at 468.
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federal jurisdictions and follow an exclusionary policy in strict liability
actions as well as those actions sounding in negligence.
Irene W. Bruynes
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